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Introduction 
 
In 1973, Ireland acceded to the European Communities (EC). This 
was at the third attempt. As far as some commentators are 
concerned, Irish involvement in the processes of European 
integration essentially dates from then.1 The background and 
lead up to its membership have, for the most part, been glossed 
over.2 But, as entry was never a foregone conclusion, what 
happened before accession is at least as important as what has 
taken place since. 
 
It was not inevitable that a semiperipheral state on the 
"outer ring of Europe", this island behind an island, would be 
married to a European mainstream.3 Indeed, it was not only 
because sincere economic and political changes had taken place 
in Irish policy positions – in the intervening period between 
the Treaties of Rome being signed in 1957 and the EC's first 
enlargement in 1973 – that full membership became possible. It 
was a matter of opportunism as well. Certainly, the slowly 
maturing nature of ties with the European Economic Community 
(EEC) need to be established if present and prospective 
analyses are to find their proper context. 
 
Having remained aloof from developments such as the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, P. KEATINGE (ed.), Ireland and EC membership 
evaluated, London, 1991; R. O'DONNELL (ed.), Europe: the Irish experience, 
Dublin, 2000. 
2 Exceptions to this rule include Brian Girvin and Dermot Keogh, both 
of whom have written about Ireland's first attempted entry. The 
contribution of the latter is of particular significance in many ways, but 
mainly because it anticipates what is being argued here in this article. B. 
GIRVIN, Irish economic development and the politics of EEC entry, in: R. T. 
GRIFFITHS & S. WARD (eds.), Courting the Common Market: the first attempt 
to enlarge the European Community, 1961-1963, London, 1996, pp.247-262; D. 
KEOGH, The diplomacy of 'dignified calm': an analysis of Ireland's 
application for membership of the EEC, 1961-1963, in Journal of European 
Integration History, vol.3/1(1995), pp.81-101. 
3 I. WALLERSTEIN, The capitalist world-economy, Cambridge, 1979, pp.69-
118. The term "semiperipheral" – even if unused elsewhere in this article – 
offers a truer impression of Ireland's situation, though not just in a 
geographical sense, the reality being that it was neither at the core nor 
totally on the periphery but somewhere in between. 
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early 1950s, it is often forgotten that Ireland attempted, and 
twice failed in 1963 and 1967, to join the EEC. By the same 
token, it also applied for membership of both the ECSC and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in this period, even 
if it was not especially interested in either. By the end of 
the decade, Dublin readied itself to make another application 
for full membership of the merged communities. Following this 
new set of negotiations, its third attempt proved to be more 
successful, a move subsequently endorsed by an overwhelming 
majority of the population through a referendum held on 10 May 
1972. This was no electoral accident. Ireland had been 
patiently preparing for EC entry for more than a decade. 
 
 The bulk of the electorate, various interest groups and 
most politicians, were gradually won over by the arguments 
favouring adhesion. This had not always been the case though. 
In the late 1940s, for instance, as Western Europeans convinced 
themselves that closer integration was the solution to the ills 
that had plagued the continent for centuries, Ireland's 
principal political figure, Éamon de Valera, advocated entering 
the slower stream of what was developing into a two-speed 
integration process. Indeed, he told the Council of Europe 
that: "If the nations here on the mainland of the continent 
consider that they cannot wait for us, perhaps they should 
consider going on without us by an agreement among themselves 
for a closer union".4 He was taken at his word. As a 
consequence, Ireland set about isolating itself – consciously 
and unconsciously – from the integration process. 
 
 As a country located on the geographical extremities of 
the European Union (EU), its experiences of integration are not 
unfamiliar or necessarily unique. However, in Ireland's case, 
it is quite clear that it was not necessarily the political 
elements of European integration that originally attracted 
adherents to the concept, rather it was the economic potential 
that this whole development held.5 Despite the fact that the 
EEC was recognised "first and foremost [as] a political concept 
and not merely an economic organisation with a few political 
ideas added as an afterthought", the thinly-disguised endeavour 
to utilise it as a means for economic betterment would cause 
difficulties.6 This was certainly its experience in efforts to 
convince Brussels that it was ready for all that membership 
implied. Not surprisingly, Ireland's choices were based on 
national preferences, while remaining allied to a full 
understanding of the contemporary and future possibilities that 
                                                          
4 Éamon de Valera (leader of Fianna Fáil, Ireland's main opposition 
party) speech to the Council of Europe, 17 August 1949, as quoted in M. 
KENNEDY & E. O'HALPIN, Ireland and the Council of Europe: from isolation 
towards integration, Strasbourg, 2000, p.49. 
5 Indeed, this is the central argument presented in M. FITZGERALD, 
Protectionism to liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966, 
Ashgate, 2000. 
6 Francis Biggar (Irish ambassador, Brussels) to Sheila Murphy (Irish 
external affairs official), 30 December 1961, National Archives, Dublin 
(NA), Department of the Taoiseach (D/T), S16877X/62. 
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integration held, as well as its intrinsic requirements. 
 
 In historical terms, Irish governments displayed a rather 
à la carte approach towards Europe. Quite happily entering the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), it 
somewhat reluctantly accepted Marshall Aid.7 It also 
participated in the aforementioned Council of Europe, thereby 
allowing it a political platform to raise subjects close to its 
heart. Meanwhile, it either maintained a distance regarding 
defence commitments, such as remaining outside the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ostensibly on the grounds 
of its military neutrality, or was passed over because of its 
economic tardiness, when it was refused entry into the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA). According to Andrew Moravcsik's 
criteria, it is possible to assert that national self-interest 
meant that Ireland came to favour EEC entry above any other 
relationship, including deeper Anglo-Irish ties.8 In truth, it 
was quite prepared to sacrifice a fair degree of sovereignty to 
the European institutions and other member states – something 
that daunted many other countries – in return for the benefits 
of full membership. 
 
 Up until recently, official Irish government archives and 
other source materials on these three applications have not 
been openly accessible or fully utilised but, over the next few 
years, newly discovered documents will gradually throw more 
light on this subject. The one major text that has been 
available up to now – The tortuous path by Denis Maher – was 
itself based on these sources regarding the origins and early 
functioning of European integration as it pertained to 
Ireland.9 This account obviously needs to be supplemented by 
other substantial pieces of research in the years to come if 
the full story is going to be told. 
 
 Indeed, a history of Ireland and the Council of Europe by 
Michael Kennedy and Eunan O'Halpin has recently revealed a 
major change that took place in attitudes to integration even 
as disinterest was feigned. Frank Aiken, the Irish external 
affairs minister for most of the post-war era, is known to have 
supported the "European ideal in the political and defence 
fields" at a secret ministerial meeting held in Strasbourg in 
1951. This was hardly a position that coincided with the 
government's stated policy of military neutrality, for example; 
at the same time, it might also be noted that he interestingly 
                                                          
7 T. GEIGER, Why Ireland needed the Marshall Plan but did not want it: 
Ireland, the Sterling Area and the European Recovery Program, 1947-1948, 
University of Manchester Working Paper Number 44 in Economic and Social 
History, Manchester, 2000. 
8 A. MORAVCSIK, The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power 
from Messina to Maastricht, New York, 1998, pp.5 and 162-163. 
9 D. J. MAHER, The tortuous path: the course of Ireland's entry into 
the EEC, 1948-73, Dublin, 1986, which in effect is considered to be the 
official Irish government view of the country's accession. 
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argued against a European customs union at that stage.10 This 
stand would be reversed over the next quarter of a century, 
lending itself to the conclusion that Irish positions on 
integration were to change when that suited Dublin or if they 
were necessitated. 
 
 It is within this context that Ireland's relations with 
the EEC from the Treaties of Rome to membership must be viewed. 
This investigation is primarily concerned with analysing how 
this peripheral was initially excluded from that process, as 
well as how it perceived and reacted to the consequences of 
being cast into limbo. At the same time, it focuses on 
presenting an account of the impact European integration had on 
the economic and political policies the government pursued. 
Additionally, it must widen an existing debate even further, 
one that is as relevant to Ireland's contemporary history as it 
will be to Europe's destiny. This analysis should not put an 
end in its infancy to a discussion regarding this particular 
country's motivations for EEC entry but, rather, must open it 
out, providing room for comparisons with other peripherals, 
while not ignoring its individuality. 
 
 
Ireland in a Europe at Sixes and Sevens 
 
By the late 1950s, to a large extent because of developments 
beyond its control, Ireland faced a Europe that had split up 
into two major trade groupings. Classed as a "peripheral" by 
the United Kingdom (UK) and by other OEEC member states from 
the earliest stages of the Free Trade Area (FTA) negotiations, 
this tag proved extremely difficult for it to shake off. 
Ireland had inherited it partially as a result of its 
endeavours to protect lesser developed members like itself, 
partly because of how they were in some ways perceived as a 
grouping – the "Forgotten Five" – even if they undeniably had 
different needs.11 
 
 Ireland's classification as a peripheral helped to 
preclude it from negotiations that saw six states sign the 
Treaties of Rome and made sure that it was actively excluded 
from negotiations to create a separate grouping of seven EFTA 
countries when the OEEC's attempts to create a seventeen-nation 
FTA finally failed. In each case, certain choices were made in 
Dublin but, in many respects, their room for manoeuvre was 
                                                          
10 Frank Aiken (Irish external affairs minister) speaking at a secret 
ministerial meeting at the Council of Ministers in July 1951, as quoted in 
KENNEDY & O'HALPIN, Ireland and the Council of Europe, pp.83-84. According 
to these authors, this "secret meeting" was just one example of the 
"informal meetings of ministers to discuss the international situation" 
that took place in Strasbourg in this period; this was an initiative that 
also had the full support of Robert Schuman (French foreign minister). 
11 M. CAMPS, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963, Princeton, 
1964, p. 211. The 'Forgotten Five' – obviously coined with the EEC or Six 
and EFTA or Seven in mind – refers to Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and 
Turkey. 
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circumscribed by the actions of others. Crucially, the 
immediacy for Ireland to decide its relative position vis-à-vis 
the EEC or EFTA was intimately linked to the choices that the 
UK was making and the effects that these would then have on 
Ireland, especially its agriculture. As long as Anglo-Irish 
economic relations remained stable, Dublin appeared reluctant 
to take any concrete European initiative.12 
 
 A radical Irish government attempt to remodel economic 
policy, spearheaded by politicians of the calibre of Seán 
Lemass and civil servants such as T. K. Whitaker, coincided 
with these major developments and divisions in European 
integration.13 Indeed, these pivotal figures propelled a 
concerted move away from provincialism and conservatism to an 
outward-looking and progressive perspective by virtue of 
confident and enlightened leadership. As industry & commerce 
minister, Lemass had warned that, in pursuing economic 
isolation in the face of a 17 nation FTA, the "implications (…) 
would be political as well as economic" and argued for a 
"reconsideration of economic aims and policies".14 Looking to 
the future rather than the past, the Irish government thus made 
a conscious decision to progress gradually, but purposefully, 
away from a foreign economic policy based on protectionism to 
one of liberalisation. 
 
 It was realised that Ireland could not remain outside of, 
and untouched by, the shake-up in European trading patterns. It 
was therefore decided that Ireland must strive for improvements 
in domestic agricultural methods and production, thereby 
boosting the strongest sector of the economy, while modernising 
its industrial base, essentially by promoting it as a prime 
location for foreign-owned and export-oriented firms to set up. 
The latter was achieved by espousing the fact that such 
companies would be able to take advantage of a generous 
government incentives package, as well as relatively low-cost, 
readily available and educated labour. It was clearly 
recognised in government that, in opening the economy up to 
external competition by the gradual elimination of quota and 
tariff barriers, inefficient indigenous industry would fail. 
Those that were strong and willing to change would survive; 
meanwhile, this sector would be supplemented by the 
                                                          
12 In economic terms, Ireland was inextricably linked to the UK. Its 
level of dependence is perhaps best illustrated by export and import 
figures. In the decade following the Second World War, on average, Ireland 
exported 89.2% of its goods to the UK, but only 5.5% to the Six. Import 
data is equally revealing, with average figures for the same post-war 
period revealing that Ireland sourced 51.5% of its goods from the UK, but 
only 8.3% from the Six. 
13 Seán Lemass was Irish deputy prime minister and industry & commerce 
minister from 1957 to 1959, thereafter prime minister to 1966, while T. K. 
Whitaker was Irish finance secretary from 1956. 
14 Lemass speech delivered to the National Agricultural and Industrial 
Development Association, 5 March 1958, as quoted in Seanad Éireann 
parliamentary debates official report, 27 March 1958, Volume 49 Columns 
330-331. 
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introduction of overseas firms. At the same time, it was 
obvious that, in seeking to revolutionise the economy, changes 
would be beneficial in their own right, though they would also 
mark a long-term reorientation in the economy from being inward 
to outward-looking. 
 
 The focus of this change would be a redirection away from 
dependence on the UK to interdependence with Europe. The means 
of achieving this aim were not yet clear, especially when 
London flirted with the Six and actively excluded Ireland from 
the Seven because it suited them.15 The UK was happy with the 
agricultural benefits that it received from the Anglo-Irish 
relationship and the industrial benefits that it would receive 
from EFTA. Ireland was of course seriously worried that, as a 
member of EFTA, Denmark might receive substantial agricultural 
concessions from the UK.16 Additionally, there were domestic 
political implications for Ireland as a result of Portugal 
being in a position to join, but as was pointed out, "Ireland 
could not accept the obligations which it is likely Portugal 
will".17 
 
As it turned out, despite its potential, EFTA did not meet 
Irish needs in agricultural terms, even if it seriously eroded 
industrial preferences in the UK market. Meanwhile, economics 
were beginning to come ahead of political considerations in 
Irish foreign policy decision-making. It was clearly time 
however for a change of leadership in Dublin, with the more 
proactive Lemass taking over from de Valera as taoiseach (prime 
minister); in turn, Jack Lynch became industry & commerce 
minister. The official Irish position regarding EFTA hardened 
as there was "little case for contemplating joining" but, as 
Dublin’s suggestion of an Anglo-Irish FTA (AIFTA) was excluded 
for the time being, it soon became clear that a little more 
imagination was required.18 Irish thoughts therefore turned to 
the possibility of EEC membership instead, a move that would 
also become a national necessity if, and when, London decided 
to apply. 
 
 Relations with its neighbour were vital to its future, no 
matter what the scenario. Ireland was effectively in an 
economic union with the UK, "one from which she could not find 
                                                          
15 Dermot Keogh has argued that the UK "strongly encouraged" Irish 
membership of EFTA; D. KEOGH, The diplomacy of 'dignified calm', p.85. But, 
this was not the case until some years after it had been created. In truth, 
both the UK and Sweden made sure that Ireland did not join in 1959. Hubert 
de Besche (Swedish foreign affairs deputy secretary) quoted in J. D. 
Brennan (Irish minister, Stockholm) to Con Cremin (Irish external affairs 
secretary), 29 May 1959, NA, Department of Foreign Affairs (D/FA), 
D/2/3Pt1. 
16 Draft Irish Department of Finance memorandum, 8 July 1959, NA, D/T, 
S16674A/61. 
17 UK Treasury note, 8 July 1959, Public Record Office, London (PRO), 
Records of the Cabinet Office (CAB), 134/1871. 
18 Irish Industry & Commerce memorandum, 14 October 1959, NA, D/T, 
S15281T. 
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a way of disengaging".19 Indeed, despite having left the 
British Commonwealth more than a decade earlier, it was, to all 
intents and purposes, especially in economic terms, still a 
member. The UK was determined though not to treat the OEEC 
peripherals as a distinct entity or Ireland any better within 
that context.20 In many ways a "millstone" around its neck, 
Ireland was relatively low on London's list of priorities, 
especially if the UK could maintain easy access for its 
industrial goods into the Irish market and continue to source 
cheap agricultural produce from there.21 On the other hand, in 
part seeing it as an escape-route from dependency, Ireland saw 
EEC membership as a reasonable step for it to take, especially 
if the UK itself applied. It was not as if Ireland would have 
had much of an alternative. 
 
 
Attempted entry ... and exclusion 
 
In the end, there were many reasons why Ireland tried to join 
and was then effectively excluded. Attempted entry into the EEC 
was a logical step in – what had been up until then – its 
disjointed European integration process. The facts are simple 
enough. It had always been clear in Irish circles that they 
faced four choices. If the UK applied to join the EEC, Ireland 
could do the same or do nothing; if the former decided not to 
apply, the latter still had a similar choice regarding whether 
or not it should apply. Ireland's four choices effectively 
boiled down to none once Harold Macmillan, the UK prime 
minister, informed the Irish that his government was finally 
going to make its move.22 Ireland had to apply too if it was 
going to protect its economic standing. 
 
 From an uncomfortable position on the sidelines at the 
turn of the decade, Ireland applied to join the EEC on 31 July 
1961, knowing full well that the UK was itself about to do the 
same, as in fact happened on 10 August. Even though the London 
government applied ten days after Dublin, there was no 
disguising the fact that the Irish had applied because their 
neighbours were about to do so too.23 Ireland's experience of 
                                                          
19 P. GERBET, La construction de l'Europe, Paris, 1983, p.294. 
20 UK Treasury note, 8 April 1959, PRO, CAB, 130/136. 
21 Anthony Meyer (UK foreign office official) note, 6 June 1961, PRO, 
Records of the Foreign Office (FO), 371/158219. 
22 Harold Macmillan (UK prime minister) to Lemass, 26 July 1961, NA, 
D/T, S16877N. 
23 The Dublin government had stolen a march on the UK; there is no 
suggestion here that these applications were synchronised. Quite the 
opposite, in fact; the Irish applied ten days earlier in order to make 
political capital. As Macmillan subsequently recorded, the "Prime Minister 
of Eire had made it clear that if Britain went into the Common Market his 
country would probably wish to do so". H. MACMILLAN, At the end of the day, 
1961-1963, London, 1973, p.11. London had learned that it could not easily 
persuade the Irish to do its bidding in such matters; the latter had a way 
of choosing its own "appropriate moment" when making its choices in 
European matters, sometimes to the detriment of UK interests. H. A. F. 
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the negotiation process soon made it clear that it was a 
secondary consideration for the Six as well; indeed, the Irish 
suspected, with good reason, that – of the four applicants – 
they were fourth in line. Accession negotiations with the UK 
were not long in coming, opening in October 1961, before being 
followed by the Danes a month later and the Norwegians a year 
after that again. There had previously been mutterings in the 
Irish external affairs ministry that "we applied first".24 But, 
it was wisely decided that it would be both rash and "impolitic 
to rush" the Six into a decision. The fear was that otherwise 
they "may take up the position suggested by the most negatively 
minded member, this being the line of least resistance".25 
 
 In January and May 1962, Ireland was twice required to 
present its case for EEC membership at gruelling meetings in 
Brussels; indeed, the EEC Council of Ministers only decided in 
October 1962 to approve its proposal for negotiations to begin. 
At the start of that year, the taoiseach divided his 
presentation to the Council into two parts, one addressing 
political aims, another firmly centred on economic issues. 
However, he was not entirely convincing on either. His woolly 
political assertions – that the Irish "people have always 
tended to look to Europe for inspiration, guidance and 
encouragement" – were always going to need substantiation if 
his government was to convince the EEC regarding Ireland's 
propensity for membership. Following this up with an extensive 
list of economic difficulties, ills and needs, was not the best 
way to satisfy the EEC that Ireland was ready to join on that 
score either.26 The Irish soon found themselves back in 
Brussels when the Council submitted a list of fifteen questions 
on aspects of their position upon which they needed further 
elucidation. 
 
 This second presentation saw senior Irish civil servants 
dealing with each of the issues raised by this questionnaire in 
front of the Six permanent representatives in Brussels. Rather 
suddenly, it was the economic aspects of Ireland's candidacy, 
rather than political aspects, that were attracting all the 
attention. By the spring of 1962, an important realisation was 
dawning on the Dublin government; it was economics, not so much 
politics, which was going to be the vital consideration in its 
case for full membership. Over the next few months, while 
continuing to allay any fears that it might have on Ireland's 
political capacity for entry – regarding its neutrality, for 
instance – the taoiseach concentrated on convincing the EEC 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rumbold (UK foreign office official) memorandum, 1 June 1961, PRO, FO, 
371/158219. 
24 T. O'Carroll note (Irish external affairs official), 12 August 1961, 
NA, D/T, S16877O/61. 
25 Whitaker to Cremin, 1 March 1962, NA, D/T, S17246D/62. 
26 Lemass speech to the EEC Council of Ministers, 18 January 1962, as 
quoted in D. J. MAHER, op.cit, pp.375-385. 
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that there was nothing to worry about on either score.27 
Beginning with an invitation to prominent European and UK 
journalists to visit the country in September 1962, Lemass 
followed up this public relations coup with a tour of the main 
European capitals the following month. His efforts paid off 
when an official communication was issued by the Council to the 
effect that the Six had decided unanimously to accede to 
Ireland’s entreaty to open accession negotiations.28 
 
 The fact that the UK's application for membership was 
vetoed by Charles de Gaulle, the French president, less than 
three months later effectively meant that Irish efforts were 
somewhat in vain. Nonetheless, in the intervening eighteen 
months between its decision to apply for full membership and 
the UK's exclusion, the Dublin government had at least been 
preparing itself and the general population – specifically 
Irish agriculture and industry – for the exigencies that 
membership would require. With the prospect of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) there were obvious market benefits 
for the farming community, explaining why the National Farmers' 
Association and the agricultural lobby was so in favour of 
membership, but achieving greater efficiency and higher 
production levels was proving to be a problem. The opening up 
of the traditional UK agricultural market to European 
competition would mean that imaginative enterprise and rapid 
adaptation was required if Irish farmers and exporters were to 
be successful, something Lemass was keen to stress.29 However, 
if the scenario facing agriculture presented an opportunity, 
the future for industry could be seen as a threat.30 
 
It was readily apparent that indigenous Irish industry was 
going to have to adapt or fail especially as it was felt that 
accession would be achieved by the end of the decade, the 
promulgation of "membership by 1970" a constant refrain.31 It 
was a case of modernising or dying and the taoiseach was quick 
to emphasise the need to adapt to the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions and the industrial lobby.32 It was clear that the car 
assembly industry and textile production would suffer when 
                                                          
27 In truth, by the time Lemass famously declared that Ireland was 
"prepared to yield even the technical label of neutrality" – seen by some 
as an impediment to Irish entry even though it had applied for full and not 
associate membership – the focus of EEC attention had shifted to its 
economic capacity. New York Times, 18 July 1962, as quoted in D. J. MAHER, 
op cit, p.152. 
28 Emilio Colombo (EEC Council president) to Lemass, 23 October 1962, 
NA, D/T, S17339/62. 
29 Lemass to Juan Greene (National Farmers' Association president), 13 
July 1961, NA, D/T, S16877M/61. 
30 Matthew McCloskey (US ambassador, Dublin) to John F. Kennedy (US 
president), 14 September 1962, John F. Kennedy presidential library, Boston 
(JFK), Kennedy Papers (KP), NSC Box#18. 
31 Lemass interview with the Irish Independent, 23 April 1965, NA, D/T, 
S17427Q. 
32 D/T memorandum on a meeting held on 11 July 1961 between Lemass and a 
deputation from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 14 July 1961, NA, D/T, 
S16877N/61. 
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their places in Ireland's protected economy were exposed to the 
realities of liberalised trade. However, efficient industries, 
especially those benefiting from foreign direct investment, 
would prosper with the result that the gains to Irish industry 
from full EEC membership would outweigh the losses.33 
 
 Essentially, Ireland was unable to join the EEC in 1963 
because it was not possible for it to do so on its own. It was 
too economically dependent on the UK. Ireland's application was 
effectively tied to the fortunes of its neighbour. This was 
despite all declarations to the contrary.34 If that was not the 
case, it could still have joined independently of London; 
indeed, the taoiseach had previously reassured the French 
president that Ireland wanted to enter whether or not the UK 
itself ultimately adhered.35 It can be assumed that, just like 
the Danes, there were limited overtures for Ireland to press on 
with its application, but it was incapable of so doing. The 
"feasibility" of full membership had been considered.36 But, 
without the UK's accession, it was not yet possible to join for 
economic reasons, though it was clear that the time would come. 
Excluded from EFTA four years earlier, Dublin subsequently 
realised that this was not necessarily a bad thing. It was 
quite sure however that it eventually wanted Ireland to join 
the EEC.  
 There were considerable domestic reasons why Ireland was 
being encouraged to take part in the European integration 
process, including parliamentary support and the lobbying done 
by informative pressure groups such as the Irish Council of the 
European Movement chaired by Garret FitzGerald, a respected 
economic and political commentator.37 Obviously, there were 
external considerations as well, ranging from the support of 
the United States (US) for British and Irish entry to an 
understanding in London that the UK could not stand in 
Ireland's way.38 Ostensibly, there was also support from the 
                                                          
33 McCloskey to Kennedy, 14 September 1962, JFK, KP, NSC Box#18. 
34 Lemass speaking at a press conference, 5 September 1962, as quoted in 
D. J. MAHER, op.cit., p.158. In fact, the taoiseach admitted as much when 
he said: "a failure of the British negotiations would require us to 
reconsider our position in the light of the circumstances which may then 
prevail". Lemass speech to the Cork Chamber of Commerce, 15 November 1962, 
NA, D/T, S17389/62Annex. 
35 Pierson Dixon (UK ambassador, Paris) to the Foreign Office, 17 
October 1962, PRO, FO, 371/164772; Dixon to the Foreign Office, 19 October 
1962, PRO, FO, 371/164772. 
36 Lemass to Seán MacBride (former Irish foreign minister), 7 May 1963, 
NA, D/T, S17427G/63; MacBride to Lemass, 10 June 1963, NA, D/T, S17427G/63; 
Lemass to MacBride, 13 June 1963, NA, D/T, S17427G/63. 
37 Garret FitzGerald (Irish Council of the European Movement chairman) 
to Whitaker, 29 April 1961, NA, D/T, S16023C/61. Of course, this 
supplemented the information that the government was receiving from 
diplomatic sources, but there is little evidence to suggest that this lobby 
group was particularly influential. 
38 Clearly, the US was particularly interested in the UK joining the EEC 
but, because Ireland had applied for full and not associate membership, it 
enjoyed a strong degree of US support as well. McCloskey to Kennedy, 14 
September 1962, JFK, KP, NSC Box#18. At times, the UK's view of Ireland was 
more ambiguous and self-interested; indeed, surreptitious attempts to 
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Six, even if the institutions themselves were not always 
convinced of the propensity of such a move.39 Ultimately, the 
decision lay with the Irish government and it was convinced 
that membership would be good for the country. 
 
 
Third time lucky 
 
At the third time of asking, Ireland managed to join the EEC, 
along with Denmark and the UK – the Norwegians demurring – 
during the first wave of enlargement in 1973. In some respects, 
partly because it was a peripheral, its entry was unique, but 
it has been argued here that this was not an exclusive or 
predestined phenomenon; indeed, Ireland’s singularity might 
have as readily been interpreted as being as troublesome as it 
was appealing. The reality of this position begs an obvious 
question: why was Ireland allowed to join? Whitaker argued in 
1962 that "nobody so loves us as to want us in the EEC on our 
own terms".40 Indeed, why did it thus become the first 
peripheral to accede? 
 
 The role external and internal influences played cannot be 
underestimated. During the course of the 1960s, the Irish 
government worked very hard to make its case for membership 
convincing. However, it was not just a case of Ireland looking 
to Europe, as it was also paying full attention to matters 
closer to home and across the Irish Sea. As Roy Foster 
declares, it would indeed be "disingenuous" to argue that the 
European continent is more influential than Ireland's closest 
neighbour.41 So, who was responsible for this turn around in 
Irish fortunes and who or what were these powerful influences? 
 
 Certainly, Ireland would not have contemplated joining 
without the UK acceding as well; in reality, it would not have 
applied in the first place way back in 1961 if the latter had 
not indicated that it was about to do the same. It would have 
been an "economic disaster" for it to do otherwise.42 In the 
intervening period between initially applying and finally 
succeeding, the government had constantly been readying itself, 
as well as the rest of the country, for the uncertain vagaries 
that full EEC membership implied, while also readily 
acknowledging and recognising its real and inherent value. The 
effects, especially on industry, but also on agriculture, of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dissuade its attempted entry were made. Roderick Barclay (UK foreign office 
official) minutes, 18 & 21 July 1961, PRO, FO, 371/158220; Cremin 
memorandum, 26 July 1961, NA, D/T, S16877N/61. 
39 Florence O'Riordan (Irish chargé d'affaires ad interim, The Hague) 
report, 11 August 1961, NA, D/T, S16877O/61; S. TOSCHI, Washington – London 
– Paris: an Untenable Triangle (1960-1963), in: Journal of European 
Integration History, vol.1/2(1995), pp.81-109. 
40 Whitaker to Jack Lynch (Irish industry & commerce minister), 5 
January 1962, NA, D/T, S16877X/62. 
41 R. FOSTER, Paddy and Mr Punch: connections in Irish and English 
history, London, 1993, pp.31-32. 
42 Whitaker to Lynch, 5 January 1962, NA, D/T, S16877X/62. 
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shifting the Irish economy from protectionism to liberalisation 
were to be profound. 
 
 In signing the AIFTA agreement in 1965, Ireland clearly 
demonstrated that it could compete on an even economic playing 
field with the UK, at the same time showing that bilateral 
Anglo-Irish political relations had finally matured beyond 
pubescence. Dublin was even prepared to take a step backwards 
towards further dependence on the UK in order to go two steps 
forward in the direction of interdependence with Europe.43 This 
was readily recognised by the EEC, while confirming the view in 
Brussels that – though it might not have been joining as part 
of some UK package or addendum – Ireland was only now dealing 
with the reality of its economic situation. There was still 
some way to go in its transition from being a marginal 
consideration. In the lead up to – as well as during, their 
second and third applications – the Irish were very aware of 
the need to maintain close contact with the UK. At the same 
time, they had to work on their own case for membership, 
convincing the EEC that Ireland was ready to join when that 
became more feasible for its neighbour.44 
 
 Closer to home, repeated calls by farmers and federalists 
for Ireland to join were tempered by the plight that indigenous 
industry faced. However, pure economics favoured membership. 
Countries like Italy and Germany were importing considerable 
quantities of Irish cattle and beef, even if Irish manufactured 
goods were slowly becoming more significant. In turn, Ireland 
was importing manufactured goods demanding high capital and 
technological input, including cars and scooters. Thus, the Six 
provided a ready market for Irish agricultural produce and a 
ready source for the consumer products its population demanded. 
 
In political circles, the arguments for joining the EEC 
were already won. Even if the left was divided on the subject, 
the overwhelming majority of politicians in both houses of 
parliament recognised the inevitability and imperative behind 
accession. Persuading the Irish population that this was the 
case proved to be no mean feat. But, it was achieved with some 
style when over eighty-three per cent of the polled electorate 
                                                          
43 As evidence of this, it is possible to point to a considerable change 
that took place in Irish trading patterns. During the years in which Lemass 
was taoiseach, the average figures for exports to the UK and the Six were 
72.8% and 8.4% respectively; concurrently, import figures became 50.7% and 
14.1%, proof of a significant economic reorientation. In fact, this was an 
ongoing pattern. Trade with the EEC increased dramatically in the period 
after its creation was mooted in 1955, when 4.4% of Irish goods went in 
that direction; on the eve of its third set of negotiations at the end of 
the 1960s, it stood at 11.3% of exports. In the same period, exports to the 
UK fell from 89.2% to 65.9%, a significant and ongoing decrease. All data 
comes from official figures to be found in CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, 
Ireland: trade and shipping statistics, Dublin, volume published in 1959, 
pp.5-10; vol.1969, pp.16-17 and 26-27; and vol.1970, pp.14-15. 
44 Irish embassy (Brussels) report, 27 January 1965, NA, D/T, 
S17427Q/62; Department of the Taoiseach report, 24 March 1965, NA, D/T, 
S17427Q/62. 
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voted in favour of acceding less than five months after Ireland 
signed the Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972. Efforts 
throughout the previous decade had proved to be worthwhile and 
– even if it has been viewed in retrospect – it has rightly 
been argued that "one can scarcely doubt the economic advantage 
(…) of the time gained through the reluctance of France (…) to 
see Great Britain in the EEC".45 Ireland effortlessly slipped 
from the boundaries to the heart of the EEC once the UK entered 
too. 
 
 
Opportunity or threat? 
 
It is clear that, once the debate focused on the choices 
Ireland faced, the argument regarding whether or not it should 
join the EEC came down to determining the costs and benefits on 
two separate interlinked levels: one economic, the other 
political.46 Obviously, it was crucial to determine whether 
integration presented an opportunity or posed a threat. In the 
end however, it was just a matter of weighing up the economic 
advantages against the political price of membership. 
 
 Economically, the advantages had been made clear at the 
outset, even if the realities of the situation were rather 
passed over at times. The reasons behind its application to 
join the EEC in the first place remained as valid, perhaps even 
more so, when the second and third attempts were made. Simply 
put, Ireland needed to continue the radical revamp of its 
economy. Certainly, agriculture stood to gain from the CAP, 
while inefficient industry would undoubtedly fail in the face 
of liberalisation. Outside investment would in turn create jobs 
to replace those that would be lost, leading it was hoped to 
the steady alleviation of emigration, poverty and unemployment. 
 
Of course, this new situation would institute a reliance 
on multinationals and footloose industries with all of their 
inherent disadvantages, but that was a price that was 
considered worth paying. It would also create interdependence 
with Europe rather than establishing the autarky of myth; 
again, this was preferable to absolute reliance on the UK. By 
this stage Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret FitzGerald 
argued in the early 1970s that, though "economic dependence" on 
the UK had proved to be "unfavourable" to Ireland, "the general 
economic and trading relationship between the two countries 
will (…) necessarily be determined on a Community basis [within 
the EEC]".47 They would thus be on a much more equal footing. 
 
 Over a quarter of a century since Ireland joined and half 
a century since its inception, the EU continues to offer the 
                                                          
45 T. K. WHITAKER, From protection to free trade: the Irish experience, 
in: Administration, 21/4, 1973, pp.405-423. 
46 IRISH COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT, Opportunity: Ireland and 
Europe, Dublin, 1972, p.5. 
47 G. FITZGERALD, Towards a new Ireland Dublin 1973, p.161. 
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country an economic escape-route away from dependence on the 
UK. In 1973, two-thirds of Irish exports still went in that 
direction; those arguing in favour of joining the EEC saw 
alleviating this degree of reliance as one of the main benefits 
of membership. The UK nevertheless remains as economically 
important to Ireland today as the rest of the EU member states 
put together, one third of Irish exports going in each of these 
two directions. At the same time, dependency on the UK has been 
replaced by a greater sense of interdependency with the EU. As 
a peripheral, Ireland has thus attained what it set out to 
achieve – equality and individuality within a collective. 
 
 During the decade and a half following the signing of the 
Treaties of Rome, Anglo-Irish political relations have improved 
to such a degree that it is possible to remark that they have 
hardly ever been better. Bilateral contrivance on many policies 
has since been unmistakable, even if Ireland has generally 
demonstrated a greater degree of sophistication and far-
sightedness when dealing with its EU partners. The economic 
balance sheet had clearly shown that accession to the EEC would 
be favourable to Ireland. However, this just meant that 
questions regarding politics were explained away or ignored, 
even if there was no doubt but that the government was prepared 
to make the difficult decisions if and when required. This was 
a policy that Jack Lynch continued once he took over as 
taoiseach in November 1966. 
 
 Political considerations – such as its military 
neutrality, an independent stance in international 
organisations, sovereignty, the partitioning of the island of 
Ireland, et cetera – needed to be addressed or demonstrated to 
be of secondary importance in the different sets of 
negotiations.48 It was crucial for Irish supporters of European 
integration to stress the various economic benefits – such as 
access to the CAP or the possibility of acquiring regional and 
structural funds – while emphasising that Ireland would have a 
"seat at the table" afforded by full EC membership. In the 
process, it would no longer have to rely on unevenly balanced 
bilateral relations with the UK. In this endeavour, successive 
Dublin governments have proved to be very successful. 
 
 None of Ireland's traditional political positions, 
regarded as central to an independent foreign policy line 
during and after the Second World War, were allowed to get in 
                                                          
48 The neutrality issue is a particularly fine instance of the 
government downplaying, what had been up until the 1960s, a fundamental 
pillar of Irish foreign policy in return for economic advancement. Another 
good example was the transformation of its radical agenda at the United 
Nations into that of a more conformist participant. M. FITZGERALD, Irish 
neutrality and European integration, 1960-1972, in: M. GEHLER and R. 
STEININGER (eds.), Die Neutralen und die europäische Integration, 1945-
1995, Vienna, 2000, pp.144-172; J. M. SKELLY, Irish diplomacy at the United 
Nations, 1945-1965: national interests and the international order, Dublin, 
1997. 
  
C:\Documents and Settings\lbjplb\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\3DEQ99QL\final JEIH article.doc - 31/08/06 15
the way of an economically advantageous quid pro quo. Irish 
politicians have thus expended, but not wasted, substantial 
time and energy in directing the foreign policy agenda away 
from the political to the economic. This switch in emphasis was 
no doubt overdue. It was also considered worthwhile and has 
undeniably moved Ireland from the geographical periphery to the 
mainstream of integration. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the fifteen years from its creation to its first 
enlargement, Ireland's relationship with the EEC radically 
transformed from that of outsider to equal member. Europe 
became a focal point for government policy despite, perhaps 
even because of, its experiences. These included the traumatic 
phase of economic stagnation that occurred during the 1950s, 
disappointment regarding its utter rebuff by EFTA later that 
decade, the EEC's outright indifference to its candidacy in the 
early 1960s, and the AIFTA's express implications for it from 
the middle of that decade onwards. Once it had domestic and 
Anglo-Irish affairs in order, it looked further afield towards 
EC membership with a certain degree of openness, even if a 
large degree of opportunism – both economic and political – was 
allied to this determination. 
 
The impact of full membership on all areas of Irish life 
has been extraordinary. It has been argued here that this has 
been especially revealing in foreign policy terms. The EEC 
indisputably played a major role in shifting emphasis away from 
outdated political considerations to encouraging the government 
to give the lead in dealing more effectively with the 
requirements of a rapidly modernising world economy. This 
direction, which had been lacking for most of the 1950s, burst 
into life as the result of a number of factors, both internal 
and external, so that the 1970s opened with Ireland in a 
reasonably comfortable – and certainly a more confident – 
position. It was now ready to take on the responsibilities and 
face the challenges that would inevitably present themselves. 
Indisputably, the EEC was central to this set of changes, 
Ireland experiencing a reformation in its outlook and, in time, 
how it is itself perceived. Slowly but surely, the Irish 
learned a valuable lesson; no matter how historic, principled 
or worthy the politics, the economic periphery can be a very 
lonely place indeed. 
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